MAINE



Because it is based on proficiency and graduation rates, Maine's accountability system for high schools gives them a strong incentive to ignore their high-achieving students.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS ANALYSIS

The Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) grants states more authority over their school accountability systems than did its predecessor, No Child Left Behind (NCLB). Consequently, states now have an opportunity to design school rating systems that improve upon the NCLB model, especially when it comes to high achievers.

NCLB meant well (as did many state accountability systems that preceded it), but it had a pernicious flaw: it strongly incentivized schools to focus exclusively on low-performing students' "proficiency" and high school graduation rates, ignoring the educational needs of high achievers, who were likely to pass state reading and math tests and earn a diploma regardless of what happened in the classroom. This may be why the United States has seen significant achievement growth and much higher graduation rates for its lowest-performing students over the last twenty years but smaller gains for its top students.

Starting in 2011, former secretary of education Arne Duncan offered waivers to states that wanted the flexibility to redesign their accountability systems. In particular, states were allowed to incorporate the use of real student growth measures into their school determinations. This was a much fairer way of evaluating schools' impact on student achievement than looking only at proficiency rates, which are strongly correlated with student demographics, family circumstance, and prior achievement. And, just as significantly, well-designed growth measures can eliminate the temptation for schools to ignore their high achievers.

In 2015, Congress replaced NCLB and its waivers with the ESSA, which maintains NCLB's requirement that states assess students annually in grades 3–8 and once in high school. Under ESSA, states must now use four types of indicators to rate high schools: academic achievement (which can include student growth); graduation rates; growth toward English proficiency for English language learners; and at least one other valid, reliable indicator of school quality or student success. Furthermore, each of the academic indicators (1–3) must carry "substantial" weight and, in the aggregate, must count "much more" than the fourth.

To help states make the most of the ESSA opportunity, we have reviewed how well their present, intended, or most recently employed accountability systems serve high achievers. If a state's system doesn't do a satisfactory job of incentivizing schools to focus on high achievers, we believe that strengthens the case for changing it materially.

States may think we're being premature in evaluating their systems during this time of massive change. Please understand that our primary objective is to identify the design features of an accountability system that works for all students—which we hope will become the prevailing model now that ESEA is reauthorized and states' testing regimes are becoming stable once again.

Here we examine Maine's system for rating high school performance during the 2013–14 school year—the most recent year for which information is available. We do not examine the quality of the state's standards, tests, or sanctions for low performance.

Part I of this report, released in August 2016, examined Maine's rating systems for elementary and middle schools.

How States Can Prioritize High Achievers in Their High School Accountability Systems

In our view, states can and should take four steps to ensure that the needs of high achievers are prioritized under ESSA.

- 1. For the first academic indicator required by ESSA (academic achievement), give high schools incentives for getting more students to an advanced level. Under ESSA, states will continue to track the percentage of students who attain proficiency on state tests. They should also give high schools incentives for getting students to an advanced level (such as level four on Smarter Balanced or level five on PARCC). For example, they might create an achievement index that gives schools partial credit for getting students to a basic level, full credit for getting students to a proficient level, and additional credit for getting students to an advanced level. (It's not entirely clear from the Department of Education's proposed regulations whether this will be allowed, though we don't see anything in the law prohibiting it.)
- 2. Use the flexibility provided by ESSA to rate high schools using a true growth model—that is, one that includes the progress of individual students at all achievement levels and not just those who are low-performing or below the "proficient" line. Regrettably, some states still don't consider individual student growth, don't use it at the high school level, or use a growth-to-proficiency system that continues to encourage schools to ignore the needs of students above (or far above) the proficient level. Using true growth models—such as those that estimate a school's value added or median growth percentile—is preferable.
- 3. When determining summative high school ratings, make growth—across the achievement spectrum—count at least as much as achievement. The Department of Education's proposed regulations under ESSA require states to combine multiple factors into summative school ratings, probably through an index. Each of the first three indicators (achievement, graduation rate, and progress toward English proficiency) must carry "substantial" weight. In our view, states should (and, under ESSA, are free to) make growth count at least as much as achievement does. Otherwise, schools will continue to face an incentive to ignore their high performers. (States that don't yet roll their indicators up to a summative rating for the school receive a "not applicable" designation here.)

4. Include an indicator that gives high schools an incentive to help able students earn college credit before they graduate. One "indicator of school quality or student success" should be the percentage of students who earn college credit via AP, IB, and/or dual-enrollment programs, which are among the best ways to challenge high performers. It's important that states focus on actual attainment of college credit or the equivalent, not just participation in these programs, lest the incentives encourage the wrong behavior by schools: shoving students into AP, IB, and/or dual enrollment even if they are not prepared to succeed, leading to frustration on their part and potentially harming the experience of their higher-achieving peers. Let us also acknowledge the questionable value of many of today's dual-enrollment programs. Students are often taught not by college professors but by high school teachers, and the "college credit" earned doesn't always transfer to bona fide colleges. States should therefore encourage more high schools to offer AP and IB courses because those come with external exams, which ensure program quality and rigor.

DOES MAINE'S HIGH SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM PRIORITIZE HIGH ACHIEVERS?

INDICATOR		RATINGS	NOTES	
1.	Does the state rate high schools' academic achievement using a model that gives additional credit for students achieving at an advanced level?		Maine does not give additional credit for students achieving at an advanced level. (See Exhibit A.)	
2.	Does the state rate high schools' growth using a model that includes the progress of all individual students, not just those below the "proficient" line?		Maine does not estimate student growth at the high school level. (See Exhibit A.)	
3.	When calculating summative high school ratings, does the state assign at least as much weight to "growth for all students" as it does to achievement?		Growth plays no role in determining summative high school ratings. ⁴ (See Exhibit A.)	
4.	Does the state rate high schools' success in helping students earn college credit before graduating via AP, IB, and/or dual-enrollment programs?		Maine does not rate high schools' success in helping students earn college credit before graduating. ⁵ (See Exhibit A.)	

EXHIBIT A6

School Report Card 2014

Edward Little High School

This School's Grade

Grades 11

Principal (207) 333-6652

Superintendent KATHERINE GRONDIN (207) 784-6431

School Website www.auburnschl.edu/education/school/school.php

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Proficiency

Math 44.4%

The percentage of students who scored proficient or above on the 2012-13 MHSA and the 2012-13 PAAP.

Reading 42%

The percentage of students who scored proficient or above on the 2012-13 MHSA and the 2012-13 PAAP.

Progress

Math - All Students 45.3

The most recent 3-year average of math proficiency plus the change from the previous 3-year average. The 3-year comparisons mitigate year-to-year volatility.

Reading - All Students 39.9


The most recent 3-year average of reading proficiency plus the change from the previous 3-year average. The 3-year comparisons mitigate year-to-year volatility.

Graduation Rate

4-Year Rate 79.4
This school's 2012-13 rate. Multiply by the maximum 50 points for score on this measure. Divide by 2 to get the total school points.

5-Year Rate 79.0

This school's 2012-13 rate. Multiply by the maximum 50 points for score on this measure. Divide by 2 to get the total school points.



How the points translate to a letter grade

A = 350 plus

B = 300 C = 225

F = less than 200

Calculating the Score



Assessment participation: State assessments provide important information that informs classroom instruction and school improvement. The participation of all students ensures the progress of all learners is valued and reflected, and provides the most accurate picture of school strengths and challenges. Additionally, schools are required by State and federal law to meet at least a 95 percent participation rate. Participation of less than 90 percent results in an automatic "F" and participation between 90 and 95 percent results in a one letter grade reduction.

This school's participation rate is 91.1%

Reduction for inadequate participation: One Letter Grade

Note: Schools/districts have had an opportunity to verify all data utilized in their report card.



www.maine.gov/doe

ENDNOTES

- Michael J. Petrilli, et al., High Stakes for High Achievers: State Accountability in the Age of ESSA, pages 128–133,
 (District of Columbia: Thomas B. Fordham Institute, 2016), https://edexcellence.net/publications/high-stakes-for-high-achievers.
- 2. "Methodology," Maine Department of Education, accessed July 21, 2016, http://www.maine.gov/doe/schoolreportcards/resources/methodology.html.
- 3. Ibid.
- 4. Ibid.
- 5. Ibid.
- 6. "Maine 2014 Report Card Auburn Public Schools Edward Little High School," Maine Department of Education, accessed July 21, 2016, http://dw.education.maine.gov/DirectoryManager/Web/maine_report/SnapshotGeneral. aspx.